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WE are  in the midst  of an  extraordinary  period  of democratiza-
tion.  All  over  the  world,  authoritarian  regimes  are  being  re-
placed  with  systems  that  aim  for  democratic  self-governance.
American  aspirations,  for  a long time  so controversial  both here  and
abroad,  appear  to  have  emerged  triumphant  after  an  era  of intense
competition.  But  perhaps  the international  movement  for  democrati-
zation can help cast light on our own problems and dilemmas  as well.
Perhaps  it can make us rethink some of our own  basic practices.  So,
at least, I will be arguing.
In the last fifty years,  national government  in America has taken on
entirely  new  dimensions.'  Massive  bureaucracies  are  entrusted  with
basic  social  tasks:  promoting  economic  efficiency,  redistributing  re-
sources  to the  needy  (and  not so needy),  increasing  employment,  re-
flecting public values,  and reducing  risks. The reduction of social risks
has  perhaps  been  the  most  intense  preoccupation  of regulatory  gov-
ernment  in the last quarter  century.  An extraordinarily  wide  range  of
agencies-including  the Food  and Drug Administration,  the  Federal
Aviation Administration,  the Environmental  Protection  Agency,  the
Federal Trade  Commission,  the Occupational  Safety  and  Health  Ad-
ministration,  the  Consumer Product  Safety Administration-are
obliged  to  protect  Americans  against  the  dangers  they  face  in  daily
life.  Here  democratic  aspirations  loom  large.  Here  those  aspirations
have often been disappointed.
A  full  account  of the  reasons  would  require  a  long  story.2  But  a
pervasive  problem  is  the  use  of  rigid,  highly  bureaucratized  "con-
*  Karl  N.  Llewellyn  Professor of Jurisprudence,  University of Chicago,  Law School  and
Department  of Political  Science. This  Essay,  originally delivered  as the Ladd  Lecture at Florida
State  University in  March  1992,  is a companion piece to Cass R.  Sunstein, Democratizing Amer-
ica Through Law,  25  SUFFOLK  U.  L.  REv.  949  (1991).  That  Essay  briefly discusses  economic
incentives,  informational  strategies,  and  decentralization  as  reforms  to the  current  regulatory
state;  this Essay  focuses  in much  more detail on informational  strategies.  There is  some overlap
between  the two essays.
1.  Some of this is well-discussed  in THEODORE  J.  Lowi,  THE PERSONAL  PRESIDENT:  POWER
INVESTED,  PROMSE  UNFULFILLED  (1985).
2.  Part of it can be  found  in CAsS  R.  SUNSTEIN,  AFTER  THE  RIGHTS  REVOLUTION:  RECON-
CEIINO THE  REGULATORY  STATE  (1990)  and in Cass R.  Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991
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mand  and control"  regulation,  which  dictates,  at  the national  level,
risk  control strategies  for hundreds,  thousands, or millions of compa-
nies in an exceptionally  diverse  nation.  Such regulation  is widely inef-
ficient.  It  wastes  billions  of  dollars  by  ignoring  the  enormous
differences  among  plants and  industries  and  among  geographical  ar-
eas.  It is not  sensible to impose the  same technology  on  industries  in
diverse  areas-regardless  of whether they are polluted  or clean,  popu-
lated or empty,  or expensive  or cheap to clean up.
Equally  fundamental,  such  strategies  are  deficient  from  the  stand-
point  of a well-functioning  democratic  process.  They ensure that  out-
comes will be dictated from the center. They make no effort to benefit
from or to  increase  citizen  participation  in selecting  social  outcomes.
Often  they  ensure  that  citizens  and  representatives  will  be  focusing
their  attention  not  on  what  levels of risk  reduction  are  appropriate,
but instead on isolated extreme cases,  or on the largely incidental  and
nearly impenetrable  question of what technologies  are now available.
They  focus  on  the  question of regulatory  "means,"  a  focus  that  in-
creases the  power of well-organized  private  groups  by  allowing  them
to  press  the  law  in  the  service  of  their  own  parochial  ends.  In  this
light,  it is no wonder that some observers think our current system is a
kind  of  Madisonian  nightmare  in  which  James  Madison's  vision  of
deliberative democracy has been transformed into a system of govern-
ment as a series of interest group deals.'
I think that we should try to start over.  In many areas,  perhaps  the
first and most  basic problem  is that  Americans  lack the  necessary in-
formation.  With respect to social risks,  perhaps the first goal ought to
be to  ensure genuinely  informed  choices,  rather  than  to  dictate  out-
comes  from Washington.  In short,  our first  line of defense  should be
educative, rather  than regulatory.  Thus  far,  we have tended  to pursue
the  opposite  strategy-regulate  first,  educate  only  in  exceptional
cases.  Might we reverse our priorities?
Such a  reversal  would  steer  a middle  course  between  the  1980s  en-
thusiasm for laissez-faire  and the 1970s  embrace of regulatory govern-
ment.  Markets  do  fail; markets  for risk are  especially  unreliable.  But
we  know  enough  about  command-and-control  government  to under-
stand that regulation is no panacea.  It often  interferes with  individual
liberty. It exacts  a large toll in terms of economic  efficiency,  and it is
a disaster  from the standpoint of democracy.
This Essay  comes  in  four  parts.  Part  I  outlines  the  basic  case  for
informational  remedies.  Part  II  describes  current  initiatives  and em-
3.  See Richard  B.  Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57  U.  Cwi.  L. REv.  335 (1990).INFORMING AMERICA
pirical findings.  Part III qualifies my basic argument,  showing ways in
which informational  remedies  may  fail.  Part  IV  explains  how the ar-
guments suggested  here might require a large-scale  revision in our un-
derstandings  about  the system of free  expression.  Through this route,
I hope to suggest that the discussion of risk regulation might bear very
generally on the problem of information  and on the government's  role
in providing it.
I.  THE CASE  FOR  INFORMATIONAL  REMEDIES
Many  Americans  are  unaware  of the  risks  they  face  in  day-to-day
life.  Workers  often  do not  know about  toxic  substances  in the  work-
places  or  about  the  risks  that  these  substances  cause.  Consumers  of
ordinary foods  are unable  to evaluate the  dangers  posed by  fats,  cal-
cium,  sugar,  and  salt. People in  small communities do not know  that
toxic waste dumping has occurred.  If they know the facts,  they do not
know the risks.  From  all this,  we can  generate  a strong argument  for
informational  remedies-on  grounds  of liberty,  economic  efficiency,
and democracy.
A.  Liberty
If  people  are  unaware  of the  consequences  of their  choices,  they
are,  to  that  extent,  less  free.  Workers  who  choose  a certain  place  of
employment  do not do so freely if they do not know about the level of
risk of getting cancer  from exposure to chemicals.  Someone who buys
a  lawn  mower  has  not done  so freely  if he or  she is unaware  of the
risks of an accident.  People who vote  on policies or candidates  have  a
lot  less  liberty  if  they  lack  relevant  information  about  the  conse-
quences.  There  is  room  for  disagreement  about  how  much  informa-
tion  is  too  little  and  about  the  efficacy  of  governmental  disclosure
policies.  But it is hard to dispute the proposition that the disclosure of
information can increase  human liberty under any view of that admit-
tedly controversial  term.
B.  Economic Efficiency
When information is lacking,  there may well be a conventional case
of market failure under economic  criteria.4  To be sure,  information-
like other goods-is a scarce commodity.  Perhaps the market has pro-
4.  See PETER ASCH,  CONSUMER  SAFETY  REGULATION,  PuTrINc  A  PRICE ON  LIFE AND  LIMB
(1988);  Susan  Rose-Ackerman,  Progressive Law and Economics-and the New Administrative
Law, 98  YALE L.J. 341  (1988).
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duced the optimal level of information.  The optimal level is not com-
plete information.  If the optimal  level is produced,  there is  no market
failure,  even if there might be a problem under noneconomic  criteria.
But there are several reasons  why the market  for  information may in-
deed fail.
First,  information  is  sometimes  a public good.  Once  it  is  available
at all,  or to anyone,  it  may be available  to everyone or to many peo-
ple.  People can thus capture  the benefits  of information without hav-
ing to pay  for  its production.  Once  created,  a report  discussing  the
risks posed  by carcinogens  in the workforce  may  well benefit employ-
ees  a great deal-but  no  individual employee  has  the right incentives
to pay  his  proportional  share for  the report.  Each  employee  has the
incentive to "free  ride"  on the efforts of others.  The result is that too
little information will be forthcoming.
The point applies to materials about shared risks in general. Indeed,
the point applies  to materials  about  all matters of shared importance.
It  suggests  that  there  is  a  strong  case,  on  economic  grounds,  for  a
good deal of governmental interference in the information market.
Second,  manufacturers  may have poor incentives  to provide  infor-
mation  about  hazardous  products.  Competition  over  the  extent  of
danger  may decrease  total purchases  of the product,  rather than help
any particular manufacturer  to obtain greater  sales. The phenomenon
has  sometimes  played  a role  in  discouraging  competition  over  safety
among manufacturers  of tobacco products.'
Information  asymmetries  may  produce  a  "lemons"  problem  in
which  dangerous  products  drive  safe  ones  out of the market. 6 Imag-
ine,  for  example,  that  producers  know  which  products  are  safe  but
that consumers  cannot tell.  Safe  products may not be able  to compete
if they sell for a higher price than dangerous  ones if safe products are
more  expensive  to produce,  and if consumers  are  unable  to  tell  the
difference.  In that  case,  the  fact that  sellers  have information,  while
buyers do not, will ensure that "lemons"-here  dangerous  products-
will dominate  the market.  All this suggests  that  there  is  frequently  a
market failure in the provision of information.  At least as a presump-
tive matter, government  remedies  are an appropriate  response.  These
remedies should ordinarily  take the form of governmentally  provided
information,  education  campaigns,  or  disclosure  requirements  im-
posed on private  firms.  Strictly  on  economic grounds,  there  is  much
5.  There are,  however,  many  cases  where  companies  compete  over  safety  and,  in  that
sense, the market often  works as an effective  check on dangerous products.
6.  See George  A.  Akerlof,  The Market  for "'Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Mar-
ket Mechanism, 84 Q.J.  EcoN. 488 (1970).INFORMING AMERICA
to be said  in  favor of these remedies.  They  may fortify the operation
of the marketplace.  They may  also be a precondition  for free  choice,
the background  assumption of efficient markets.
C.  Democracy
Suppose  that  we  wanted  to  increase  the  democratic  character  of
contemporary  government  by  promoting  citizen participation  in  and
control over governmental processes.  A good initial step would be for
government  to  provide  enough  information  for  people  to  make
knowledgeable judgments.
Government  itself  might  supply  information  or  require  disclosure
by private citizens  and companies.  Consider,  for example,  the matter
of expenditures per lives saved .7  There is now considerable  data on the
amount of money spent to save lives in various government programs.
What  emerges  is  a  crazy  quilt,  and very  few  people  know  about  it.
Some programs pay for themselves  in terms of health and related sav-
ings; others are extremely hard to defend. At the very least, the Amer-
ican  public  should  be  informed  of  these  disparities  so  that  it  can
evaluate  them.  Provision  of information  about  the  content  and  ex-
pense  of  regulatory  programs  should  be  high  on  the  governmental
agenda.  Without  such  information,  people  cannot  evaluate  govern-
mental  policies.  They  will  respond  to  sensationalistic  anecdotes  or
misleading stories, rather than analyze the facts.
Consider  the question  of risk regulation  in general.  On that  ques-
tion,  people  are  poorly informed.'  For  example,  they  appear  not  to
know that the risks of nuclear power are substantially smaller than the
risks posed  by other  energy  sources.  They  appear  not to have  a clear
sense of the relationships among different  risks that are confronted  in
everyday  life.  Smoking,  for  example,  produces  more  than  345,000
deaths  per  year; 9  all  occupations  produce  about  11,000  annual
deaths, 0  although  this number  is disputed;  and  nearly  50,000  deaths
come from automobile accidents."l
7.  See SuNsTEiN,  RIGHTs  REvOLuTIoN,  supra note 2,  app. B.
8.  See generally  STEPHEN  G.  BREYER,  BtAKINO Tm  VIciOUS  CIRCLE:  TowARD  EFFEcTV
RISK  REGULATION  (forthcoming  1993).  Some  of this  is  undoubtedly a product  of  heuristics  of
various  sorts. See Paul Slovic  et al., Informing the Public  About the Risks from Ionizing Radia-
tion,  in JUDGMENT  AND  DECISION  MAKING:  AN  INTERDISCIPLINARY  READER  (Hal  R.  Arkes  &
Kenneth  R.  Hammond  eds.,  1986).  More information,  however,  could  help  overcome  some of
the relevant biases.
9.  See ROBERT E.  GOODIN,  No SMOKING:  THE ETHIcAL IssuEs 8 (1989).
10.  See W.  Ki  Viscusi,  FATAL  TRADEOFFS:  PUBLIc  AND  PRIVATE  REsPoNsmarias  FOR  RISK
3 (1992).
11.  Id.
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Information of this sort ought to be widely available.  The fact that
it is not creates  a significant  failure in government  regulation.  At least
equally  important,  it  presents  a  large  obstacle  to  citizenship.  The
problem appears in the private  sector,  in  local government,  and at the
state and  national  levels.  Workers uninformed  of risks  are  unable to
participate  usefully  in the process  of deciding  among  different  possi-
ble  levels of workplace  safety.  Local  communities,  seeking  to  decide
whether  to allow  toxic waste  sites or plants  that produce  sulfur diox-
ide, need to be in a position to make informed  choices.
A large virtue of a federal  system is that it permits  different  states,
having  different  values,  to  make  different  choices  about  social  ar-
rangements.  In  the  context  at  hand,  many decisions  about  the  rela-
tions  among industrial  development,  employment,  pollution,  and risk
must be made  at the state level.  An absence of information is a severe
obstacle to  this process.  The same  is  true at the national  level,  where
sensational anecdotes  displace reasoned  analysis of the alternatives.
The most general  way  to  put  the point  is  to note  that on  the fra-
mers'  view,  America  was  supposed  to be  a deliberative  democracy  in
which  representatives,  accountable  to  the  people,  would  make  deci-
sions  through  a  process  of deliberation  uncontrolled  by  private  fac-
tions.' 2  Without  better  information,  neither  deliberation  nor
democracy  is possible.  Legal reforms designed to remedy the situation
are a precondition for democratic  politics.
D.  The Comparative  Advantages of Informational  Remedies
Thus far,  we  have  seen  that provision  of information  may  well  be
an improvement  over a system of laissez-faire.  We can simultaneously
promote  liberty,  efficiency,  and democracy  with  informational  reme-
dies,  even though these goals are sometimes thought  to conflict.  Such
remedies  would also  make for  large gains  as compared  with  existing
regulatory  measures,  at least in many contexts.  As noted,  those struc-
tures consist of massive command-and-control  structures,  dictating in-
dividual  outcomes  for  hundreds,  thousands,  and  even  millions  of
individuals  and groups.  How would informational  strategies  compare
with current approaches?
From the standpoint  of liberty,  those approaches  have  large draw-
backs.  Most  important,  they  do  not  allow  individuals  to  make  in-
formed  choices among possible options. There are two problems here.
12.  See THE FEDERALIST No.  10  (James  Madison); Joseph  M.  Bessette,  Deliberate Democ-
racy: The Majority Principle, in AaERICA  GOVERNxENT,  How  DEMOCRATIC  IS THE  CONSTITU-
TION?  102  (Robert  A.  Goldwin  & William A.  Schambra eds.,  1983);  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Interest
Groups in American Public  Law,  38 STAN.  L.  REv.  29 (1985).INFORMING AMERICA
The first is that inadequate information is a serious obstacle to liberty.
To  the  extent  that  current  approaches  do  not provide  information,
they disserve this goal.
The second problem is that governmentally prescribed outcomes un-
necessarily  diminish  the  role  of  individual  decisions  and  choices  in
forming individual lives. At least across a broad range of possibilities,
people  should be  allowed  to  select  their  preferred  mixes  of risk,  em-
ployment,  salary,  medical  care,  and  so  forth.  If their  choice  is  irra-
tional,  or if it  has  large  consequences  for  others,  the government  is
entitled to  intervene.  But  the presumption should  be in  favor of pri-
vate  choice.  Because  current regulatory  law  forecloses  private choice
in  favor  of nationally  mandated  outcomes,  it  disserves  liberty,  cer-
tainly in comparison to a system in which information is provided.
It is  no answer  to say  that private  choices  are often constrained  by
lack  of sufficient  opportunities  or  by  unjust  background  conditions.
Mandated  regulatory  systems  often  seem  best  because  without  them,
people  in  difficult  conditions  may  be  forced  to  take  risky  (but  rela-
tively  remunerative)  jobs,  or  to  purchase  less  safe  but  inexpensive
products.  This  is  often true;  people  in  difficult conditions  will trade
off greater  risk  for  other  goods  they favor,  and  sometimes  the risks
will be  serious.  We should  do everything  we can to increase  opportu-
nities,  to  prevent  or  ease difficult  conditions,  and to  diminish  injus-
tice.  But a  regulatory requirement  that forecloses  the best  of a set of
bad  options  is  a  singularly  poor  strategy  for  accomplishing  any  of
these  goals.  If  people  are  forced  to  accept  higher  risks  for  more
money,  that  is their choice.  At  least as a general  rule,  we do them no
favors if we  require them to have less  money and lower  risks,  if they
want  (as  we  are  assuming)  more  money  and  higher  risks.  Thus  far,
then,  the  provision  of information  seems  far  preferable  to  govern-
mentally mandated outcomes,  at least on grounds of liberty.
What  of economic  efficiency?  The  sad  truth  is  that  existing  pro-
grams are often extremely inefficient. 3 They cost far more than is nec-
essary  to  accomplish  their  salutary  goals.  They  waste  billions  of
dollars.  They penalize  investment,  both in general  and (especially  per-
verse)  in  newer,  safer technologies.  Precisely  because  of their unifor-
mity,  they  force  a  wide  range  of actors  into  the same  mold.  In  this
way,  too,  they  diminish  economic  efficiency,  which  calls  for  the  in-
vestment  of  social  resources  in  places  where  they  will  do the  most
good.  Existing  programs  are  extremely  expensive to enforce  both be-
13.  Bruce A.  Ackerman & Richard B.  Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Demo-
cratic Casefor  Market Incentives, 13  COLUM.  J.  ENvrt.  L.  171  (1988).
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cause  of the  burden  they  impose on government  and because  of the
high cost of private resources that must be spent on compliance.
On all of these  scores,  informational  approaches  have  large advan-
tages.  They  are  much more  flexible.  Because  they  leave  considerable
room  for  freedom  of choice,  they avoid  the inefficiencies  of central-
ized dictation  of outcomes.  They  are  generally  far  less  expensive  to
implement  for private  industry and to  enforce  for government.  They
impose much  less of a disincentive to productive  investment.  Indeed,
precisely because they call attention to social risks,  they create  a good
incentive  for technological  advances  in the  area  of safety.  This  is  a
huge advantage  over  existing  systems,  where  the  incentive  often runs
in the opposite direction.
Along  the  dimension  of  democracy,  informational  strategies  have
equivalent  strengths.  Command-and-control  regulation  has  especially
serious  democratic  drawbacks.  Usually  centralized  in Washington,  it
is far too remote to encourage or benefit  from widespread  citizen par-
ticipation.  A  national  decision  about  the  appropriate  technological
controls on  a toxic  air pollutant will  have  only an attenuated  connec-
tion to democratic processes.
In  addition,  the  current  system  strongly  encourages  interest  group
maneuvering.  If  Congress  is  attempting  to  specify  the  particular
means  by which to decrease  the pollution  brought  about  by gasoline,
it will be especially  vulnerable  to well-organized  private groups.  Such
groups will attempt,  and have  often attempted,  to promote their own
welfare through  obtaining  pollution  control  technologies  that  benefit
them.  The creation  of such  incentives  is  poorly  suited  to  democrati-
cally  controlled  risk  reduction.  It  is  highly  likely  that  Congress  will
end up pleasing  the relevant  groups with  a mechanism  that  helps the
most powerful and well-organized  lobbyists.
Finally, and perhaps most important,  a command-and-control  strat-
egy will have democratic defects  precisely to the extent the citizenry is
poorly informed.  We cannot  expect  people  to participate  well,  or to
participate  at  all,  if they  lack  information  about  the relevant  prob-
lems.
In these circumstances,  the provision of information  seems to have
large democratic  advantages  over the regulatory  status quo.  It should
promote decentralization,  not  only  by  allowing  markets  to  function,
but also  by eliminating  nationally  mandated  solutions and increasing
the  power  of  states  and  local  communities.  It  should  diminish  the
power of well-organized private groups; interest group maneuvering  is
certainly  possible,  but  probably  less  likely,  when  the  government  is
simply providing or requiring provision of information. And it shouldINFORMING AMERICA
help democratic  self-governance  precisely  to the extent that it ensures
that people will  be more informed.
II.  EMPIucAL  EVIDENCE:  WHAT  WE'VE DONE,  WHAT WE KNow
Thus  far, we have seen that informational  strategies have important
advantages over both laissez-faire and the current  system of regulating
social  risks.  But  the discussion  has been  relatively  abstract  and  a bit
speculative.  In  this  section,  I turn to  some  details.  Part  A  discusses
current initiatives. Part B outlines the current record.
A.  What We've Done
The national  government  has  started  a series  of steps  in  the direc-
tion of information disclosure.  Mandatory messages about  risks from
cigarette smoking,  first set out in 1965 and modified  in 1969 and 1984,
are,  of course, the most  familiar example.' 4 The FDA has long  main-
tained a policy of requiring risk labels for pharmaceutical  products."
The  EPA has  done  the  same  for pesticides  and  asbestos. 6 Congress
requires  warnings  on  products  with  saccharin.  There  are  numerous
other illustrations.  Indeed,  the effort to provide information  counts as
one  of  the  most  striking,  if  still  incipient,  developments  in  modern
regulatory  law.  Three recent initiatives are especially notable.
In  1983 the Occupational  Safety  and  Health Administration  issued
a Hazard  Communication  Standard  (HCS) that  applied  to the manu-
facturing  sector.  In  1986  the HCS  was  made  generally  applicable.'
Under the HCS,  chemical  producers  and  importers  must evaluate  the
hazards  of the  chemicals  they  produce  or import;  develop  technical
hazard information  for materials safety data sheets and for hazardous
substances labels;  and, most importantly, transmit this information to
users  of the relevant  substances.  All  employers  must adopt  a hazard
communication  program-including  individual  training-and  inform
workers of the relevant risks.
In  1986 Congress enacted  an ambitious  new  statute, the Emergency
Planning  and Community  Right to Know Act  (EPCRA).
8  Under  this
statute,  firms  and individuals  must  report  to state  and  local  govern-
ment the quantities  of potentially hazardous  chemicals that have been
stored or released into the environment.  Users of such  chemicals must
14.  15  U.S.C.  §§  1331-1334 (1988);  see also W.  Yap  Viscusi,  SMOKiNG:  MAKING  THE  RISKY
DEcISIoN (1992).
15.  21 U.S.C.  §§  351-360ee (1988).
16.  15 U.S.C.  §§ 2601-2655  (1988).
17.  29C.F.R. § 1910.1200(1989).
18.  42 U.S.C.  §§ 9601-9622 (1988).
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report  to  their  local  fire  departments  about the location,  types,  and
quantities  of stored chemicals.  They must  also give information  about
potential  adverse  health  effects.  A  detailed  report  suggests  that  EP-
CRA  has  had important  beneficial  effects,  spurring innovative,  cost-
effective  programs  from  the  EPA  and  from  state  and  local  govern-
ment. 9
The Food  and Drug Administration  has also adopted informational
strategies.  In its  most ambitious  set of proposals,20  the FDA seeks  (a)
to compel nutritional labeling on nearly all processed  foods,  including
information  relating  to  cholesterol,  saturated  fat,  calories  from  fat,
and  fiber; (b) to require compliance with government specified serving
sizes;  (c)  to compel companies  to conform  to  government definitions
of  standardized  terms,  including  "reduced,"  "fresh,"  "free,"  and
"low";  and  (d) to allow health  claims only  if these (1) are supported
by scientific  evidence  and  (2)  communicate  clear  and  complete  infor-
mation  about  such  matters  as fat  and  heart  disease,  fat  and cancer,
sodium and high blood pressure,  and calcium and osteoporosis.
B.  What We Know
We now  have some empirical  information about disclosure of risks.
In general,  the  information  suggests  that disclosure  can be  a helpful
and cost-effective  strategy. 2'  Workers  appear to respond to new  infor-
mation about risks by quitting or demanding  higher salaries.  Consum-
ers  often  react  well  to the  disclosure  about  danger  levels.  There  is
every  reason  to  think  that  governmentally-mandated  disclosure,  if
suitably  designed,  is  an effective mechanism  for  promoting economic
efficiency and other regulatory goals.
Let  me  add  some  specifics.  The  Superfund  statute,  EPCRA,  re-
quires  a  "toxic  release  inventory"  requiring  reports  on  toxic  emis-
sions. 22  A  1991  government  report  shows  that  the  statute  has  had
substantial  good effects. 2  The inventory  played a large  informational
role in the  1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.24  It has also contributed
19.  See G.A.O.,  Toxic Chemicals: EPA's Toxic Release Inventory is  Useful But  Can Be
Improved, REP.  TO  CONGREaSS  (June  1991).
20.  21 C.F.R.  § 101.9 (1989).
21.  See W.  Kip  VISCUsI  & WESLEY  A.  MAGAT,  LEARNING  ABOUT  RISK (1987);  W.  Kip  Vis-
cusi  et  al.,  Informational  Regulation  of Consumer  Health Risks: An  Empirical Evaluation  of
Hazard Warnings, 17  RAND  J.  ECON.  351  (1986);  W. Kip Viscusi  & Charles J.  O'Connor, Adap-
tive Responses to Chemical Labeling: Are  Workers Bayesian Decision Makers?, 74 AM.  ECON.
REV.  942  (1984).  The empirical  work  also  shows  the  need  for  care  in  designing  disclosure  re-
quirements.  See also G.A.O.,  supra note  19.
22.  42 U.S.C.  §§ 9601-9622 (1988).
23.  See G.A.O.,  supra note  19.
24.  Id.  at 3.INFORMING  AMERICA
to legislative efforts in many states,  including  Oregon and  Massachu-
setts.  It  has greatly  assisted the EPA  in its pollution  prevention  strat-
egy,  a  leading  new  weapon  in  risk  regulation,  and  it  has  also
contributed  to  the  development  of  cross-environmental  media  ap-
proaches. 2  Environmental  groups and the media have made good use
of the inventory,  listing the highest  polluting companies.
2 6  Best of all,
the inventory has led major companies to reduce pollution  even with-
out legislation. 2 7 It appears that more than half of all reporting  facili-
ties have made changes as a result of the inventory requirement.2
Evidence  of  this  sort  is  highly  suggestive,  but  it  does  not  show
whether  consumers  and  citizens  react  rationally  to new  information.
We  know disclosure has had some political  consequences.  It is impor-
tant  also to know  how such information  is  received  by  ordinary peo-
ple.  Here  too,  however,  we  are  beginning  to  accumulate  valuable
data.
A study of consumer reactions to hazard warnings contains interest-
ing lessons.29 In this  study, two products  were  tested:  a liquid  bleach
and a liquid drain  opener.  Both of these posed short-term  risks. Peo-
ple who drink bleach  (usually children) experience  vomiting and stom-
ach  aches,  a  risk that  can  be  avoided  by  keeping  the products  away
from  children.  Bleach  mixed with  ammonia  can  produce  chloramine
gas poisoning,  which  involves headaches  and  possible hospitalization.
The  risk  can be  avoided  by not mixing  bleach with  ammonia.  Drain
opener,  if accidentally ingested,  can lead  to  severe  mouth  burns and
possibly loss of the esophagus.  Spilling the product can produce pain-
ful  burns  and  swollen  blisters.  Rubber  gloves  can  prevent  these  ef-
fects.
In the study, there was  a comparison  between "no  warning"  labels
and  different labels  with  different warnings.  All  but one of the latter
labels informed consumers  of the relevant  risks, but some were larger
and  highlighted  the relevant  precautions.3 0  One  label,  called  "Test,"
was  designed  by labeling  experts.  The study showed  that the  regular
warning labels generally had  significant effects on consumer behavior,
but that the "Test"  labels produced by far the most substantial conse-
quences.  Statistically  significant  results  were  shown  in  almost  all
groups  of people  seeing  the  "Test"  label.  For  example,  consumers'
willingness  to  store  bleach  in childproof  locations  was  increased  by
25.  Id. at 21.
26.  Id. at 25-26.
27.  Id. at 3.
28.  Id. at 24.
29.  See Viscusi et al., supra note 21,  at 351.
30.  Id.
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thirty-three  percent  over  the  "no  warning"  labels.  Once  informed  of
the risks,  moreover,  consumers  showed  a desire to pay more to avoid
the  need  for  precautions.  In  general,  the  relevant  information  was
processed  reliably.  Thus the  authors of the  study concluded  that the
"results  presented here provide  a more optimistic view of the potential
efficacy of informational  approaches  ....  Households  facing partic-
ularly large risks were more likely to undertake  protective actions, and
differences  in  the  information  provided  produced  the  expected  ef-
fects." 3
Another  study attempted  to test workers'  responses  to labels  of po-
tentially hazardous  chemicals.3 2 There  was  evidence-suggestive  by it-
self-that  workers  in  dangerous  occupations  received  risk  premiums
for the dangers they faced.  Workers who perceived their jobs as quite
dangerous  received  an  annual  risk  premium  of  $700  to  $800,  while
workers  who thought  their jobs  were only somewhat  risky received  a
premium  of about $100  less.  I say  that this  evidence  is  suggestive  by
itself  because  it  shows  that  workers  will  demand  a  higher  salary  or
other compensating benefits when they know that they face workplace
dangers.
The  study presented each  worker with  a hazard warning  label for  a
chemical  that was  not a current  part of his job.  When presented  with
the  labels,  workers  generally  adjusted  their perception of the  risk as-
sessment  in their jobs. Thus  the adjustment  shows a rational  learning
process.  Moreover,  and  crucially,  the  workers  indicated  they  would
require  a higher  salary,  calibrated  to  the degree  of risk that  was  dis-
closed.  Many workers also indicated  they would refuse to continue  to
work  in  the now-riskier  job.  The  greater  the information,  the better
the reaction.
There  is  also  a  valuable  study  of the  effects  of warning  labels  on
diet  soft  drinks  containing  saccharin.33  The  data show  that after  the
warning  labels were required,  there were significant adverse  effects on
sales.  The initial effects were produced  primarily by well-educated  and
high-income households.  Soon thereafter  there were similar  effects on
households  with  young  children.  Interestingly,  there  was  no  such  ef-
fect on the soft drink purchase habits of the elderly.
- Consumer  behavior  was  also  significantly  modified  by  a  Stanford
study designed to promote  heart disease education.Y  Three California
31.  Id. at 365.
32.  Viscusi & O'Connor, supra note 21,  at 942.
33.  George  W.  Schucker  et  al.,  The Impact  of the  Saccharin  Warning Label  on Sales  of
Diet Soft Drinks in Supermarkets, 2 J. PuB.  POL'Y & MKTo.  46 (1983).
34.  See  Robert  S.  Adler & R.  David  Pittle,  Cajolery or Command:  Are  Education  Cam-
paigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation, I YALE J.  ON  REo.  159,  184 (1984).INFORMING AMERICA
communities  were selected;  two of them  were saturated  with  informa-
tion about lifestyle changes that  would reduce  heart disease.  A  "con-
trol  town"  was  not  affected.  Knowledge  increases  were  significant  in
the two saturated  communities; there  were no real changes  in the con-
trol town.  Intriguingly, there were large gains in knowledge in the less-
advantaged  Spanish-speaking  community.  Behavioral  changes  were
also  shown  with  respect  to  reported  changes  in  diets,  exercise,  and
smoking, and  also with weight  and plasma  cholesterol  levels.  Plasma
cholesterol  levels  changed  significantly  during  the course of the cam-
paign.
Less  encouraging  is  the  evidence  from  educational  campaigns  de-
signed  to increase  seat  belt  use.  It  seems  clear  that if everyone  used
seat belts,  motor vehicle  deaths  could be  halved,  and  billions of dol-
lars could  be saved.3"  But efforts  to promote  seat  belt use  have pro-
duced little results,  at least  in the United States.  (Campaigns  in  Great
Britain and  Sweden produced  increased usage rates of twenty percent
to thirty-five  percent.)  In  its most recent,  more  sophisticated  efforts,
the government's  campaign  showed  a negligible  2.6%  increase,  rang-
ing from  11.301o to 13.9%.36
California's  Proposition  65,  requiring  cancer warnings,  appears  to
have been only  a mixed  success.  One  study shows that it  has actually
decreased  information  by  making  people  think  certain  products  are
much  more  dangerous  than  they  are  in  fact.
37  Similarly,  one  study
shows  that  widely  used  chemical  labels  had minimal  effects  because
the relevant information was not provided in an effective manner.8
On  balance,  the  existing  evidence  gives  reason  for  cautious  opti-
mism  at  the  very  least.  Certainly  much  more  research  is  necessary;
here the obligatory  call for further empirical  work is especially impor-
tant.  But what  we  know  is sufficient  to suggest that it is fully appro-
priate to continue  to  work with  information  strategies  and  that such
strategies  can  accomplish  their  intended  purposes  in many  settings.  I
discuss possible lessons for reform in Part III.
III.  THE  LIMITS OF  INFORMATION
The picture thus far has been quite optimistic, and  I do believe that
optimism  is on  the whole  quite warranted.  But the  case  for informa-
tional  remedies  is  not  unqualified.  There  are  three  major  problems
35.  See id. at  171-78.
36.  Id. at 176.
37.  See  W.  Kip Viscusi,  Predicting  the Effects of Food Cancer Risk  Warnings on Consum-
ers, 43 FooD DRUG  Cosm.  L.J. 283  (1988).
38.  See Viscusi et al., supra note  21,  at  365.
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with  such strategies.  First, the provision of information can  be expen-
sive.  Second,  the provision of information  is  sometimes ineffectual or
even  counterproductive.  Third,  informational  strategies  deal  inade-
quately with some external effects of risk.
A.  Expense
Consider,  for  example,  the  fact that the  government  estimates  the
cost  of  the  new  FDA rules  as  no  less  than  $1.7  billion  over  twenty
years.  The  President  of  the  National  Food  Processors  Association
claims  that the first-year costs  alone will exceed  $2  billion. 9 In either
case,  the cost  is  high.  OSHA's  hazard  communication  policy  is  esti-
mated to save 200 lives per year-a lot-but at an annual cost of $360
million.40 The expenditure per life saved is therefore  $1.8  million.  This
is  far  better  than  a  large  number  of  regulations,  and  probably  an
amount well worth  spending,  but it  is more than many agencies  spend
for life-saving  regulations.  It is  therefore  not the case that the OSHA
rule stands out as a means of saving lives especially cheaply.  There are
many life-saving programs  that achieve the same goal-saved lives-at
lower cost.
When informational  strategies  are  costly, there are two possible re-
sponses.  The first is to do nothing.  If the savings-in  terms of health,
life,  informed  choice-are  relatively  low,  costly strategies,  even infor-
mational  ones,  make  little  sense.  There  will,  therefore,  be  circum-
stances  in  which  a government  remedy  for an absence of information
is unwarranted.  Sometimes laissez-faire  is indeed preferable.
When the costs are high, the second possibility  is to impose a  regu-
latory strategy  rather than to require disclosure.  By a regulatory strat-
egy,  I mean a mandatory outcome,  such as a flat ban on the materials
in question,  or governmental  specification of a particular outcome,  as
in  a mandated  maximum  level  of carcinogens  in the workplace.  It is
surprising  but  true  that  sometimes  the  regulatory  strategy  will  be
cheaper because  the  price of disclosing information-changing  pack-
aging  and so forth-is  so high.  This  is  likely to be the right  response
when most or  all people would respond to the information in the same
way.  In that case, it is unnecessary  to provide  information.  It is better
simply  to  dictate  an  outcome  that,  by  hypothesis,  is  generally  pre-
ferred. A flat ban  is generally  appropriate for an especially  dangerous
39.  Nancy  Ryan  & Linda  M.  Harrington,  FDA  Offers New Rules on Food Labels, Claims,
Cmi.  Tram.,  Nov.  7,  1991,  § 1, at 2.
40.  The figures come  from John  F.  Morrall,  1II,  A  Review of the Record, 10  REULATION
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substance,  one that reasonable  people  would not choose  to encounter
and that has safer substitutes.
B.  Little, No, or Bad Effects
1.  How Information  Can Go  Wrong: An Outline
Even when informational  strategies are not prohibitively  expensive,
they  may be  ineffectual  and thus have  low  benefits.  There  are many
possible problems here.
(a)  Information Processing
A central difficulty  is that people have limited ability to process  in-
formation. 4'  They  have  a notoriously difficult time  in thinking  about
low-probability  events.  Sometimes  they  discount  such  events  to  zero;
sometimes they treat them as much more dangerous  than they actually
are.  If  people  are  told,  for example,  that  a  certain  substance  causes
cancer,  they may  think it is  far more dangerous than it is in fact.  But
some carcinogenic substances  pose little risk.
For  example,  California's  Proposition  65,  an initiative  designed  to
promote  citizen  awareness  of risk levels,  requires  warnings  for expo-
sure  to  carcinogens.  At  first glance,  the  requirement  seems  unexcep-
tionable,  indeed  an  important  advance.  It  seems  to  have  all of  the
advantages  discussed  in the  first  sections  of this  Essay.  But Proposi-
tion  65 has in some cases been counterproductive  or even  worse.  Con-
sumers  appear  to  think  that  twelve  of  every  100  users  of  a  product
with  the required  warning  will die from cancer.  This estimate  exceeds
reality  by  a  factor  of  1000  or  more.42  The  presence  of  the  warning
makes  people more confused rather than more aware.
We can  generalize  from  the example.  With  respect  to information,
less may be more.  If information is not provided  in a clear and usable
form, it may actually make  people less  knowledgeable than  they were
before.
(b)  Heuristics That Produce Errors
The  problem  is  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  in  evaluating  social
risks,  people  tend  to  use  heuristic  devices  that  produce  systemic  er-
rors.  A  particular  problem  here  is  the  "availability  heuristic,"
through  which  people tend  to  think an event  is  probable  if they can
41.  See generally JUDGMENT  AND  DECISION  MAKING:  AN INTERDISCIPLINARY  READER,  supra
note 8; Viscusi, supra note  10.
42.  See Viscusi, supra note  37.
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readily bring  to mind memories of its occurrence.  Thus,  for example,
an  airplane  disaster  will  sometimes  be  thought  relatively  probable,
whereas  a  death  from  diabetes  usually  will  not  be.  There  is  a good
deal of evidence that people  overestimate  risks  from highly  visible or
sensational  causes  but  underestimate  risks  from  less  dramatic,  but
more  serious,  ones.13 The  availability  heuristic  may  distort  informa-
tional remedies  since people  may  fit  the information  to  assumptions
that are false or skewed.
(c)  Motivational  Distortions
There  is  evidence  as  well  of another  problem  with  informational
strategies:  People  often  believe themselves  to  be  immune  from  risks
that they acknowledge are significant and real with respect to others."
In  one  study,  for  example,  ninety-seven  percent  of  those  surveyed
ranked themselves  as average or above average in their ability to avoid
both bicycle and  power mower  accidents. 4 5  Disclosure  of information
,may  be  an  unhelpful  tool  when  people  do  not  internalize  the  new
data, thinking that it is really relevant only to other people.
There  is  also  evidence that people  feel frustrated and  frightened  by
probabilistic information and  greatly prefer a certain answer.  The de-
sire  to reduce  cognitive  dissonance-to  prevent  the world from  being
confusing  and frightening-may  prevent people from recognizing  that
risks are  real,  even  when  information  is  provided.4  The  same  desire
may undermine  efforts  to provide  risk information  when the truth  is
that people  must  inevitably  operate  under  conditions  of  uncertainty.
For  similar  reasons,  people may  fail to recognize  that  conditions  are
dangerous even in the face of solid information  to this effect. Finally,
initially held beliefs are not easy to modify,  even when new informa-
tion that undermines  those beliefs has been presented.47
(d)  Overload
There is  also a pervasive  risk of information overload,  causing  con-
sumers to treat a large amount of information as equivalent  to no in-
formation  at  all. 4  If  employers  are  forced  to  list  all  risks  and to
43.  See Slovic et al., supra note  8.
44.  Id.  at 116.
45.  Id.
46.  See George  A.  Akerlof & William  T. Dickens,  The Economic Consequences of Cogni-
tive Dissonance,  72  Am.  ECON.  REv.  307 (1982).
47.  See Slovic et al., supra note 8, at 118; see also ROBERT  C. ELLICKSON,  ORDER  WITHOUT
LAW:  How NEIGHBORS  SETTLE  DISPUTES (1991).
48.  See Jacob  Jacoby ct al., Corrective Advertising and Affirmative Disclosure Statements:
Their Potential  for Confusing and Misleading the Consumer, 46 J.  MKTO.  61,  70 (1982).INFORMING AMERICA
explain  them in detail,  people  may absorb  little or nothing.  If adver-
tisers are  required  to have  detailed  disclosure  labels,  consumers  may
obtain relatively little information.
(e)  Disclosure Requirements that Deter Disclosure
Yet  another  problem  is  that  companies  may  respond  to  disclosure
requirements  by  refusing  to  provide  information  at  all  (if this  is  an
available option).  If industry responds to a requirement of evidentiary
support  for  scientific  claims  with  mere  "puffing,"  consumers  may
have less information than they  did to begin with.  If advertisers must
conduct extensive tests before they are permitted to make claims,  they
will be  given a  strong  incentive  to  avoid  making  claims  at  all.
4 9 The
result will be the removal from  the market  of information that is  use-
ful overall.
(f)  Disclosure  and the Disadvantaged
Disclosure  strategies  may  also  have  disproportionately  little  effect
on  people  who  are  undereducated,  elderly,  or  poor. 0  This  is  to  be
expected,  for  information  remedies  require  an  ability  to  read  and
process.  This ability is most pronounced  among the well-educated and
the wealthy.
(g)  Public Good Issues
Finally,  information  may  be  an  inadequate  strategy  when  greater
safety  is  a public good."  Imagine,  for example,  that  the replacement
of carcinogen  X with  safe product Y would  benefit all workers simul-
taneously  because  all of them would  simultaneously be  exposed to  Y
rather than X.  Imagine too that each  worker  is bargaining separately
with  the employer.  In that  case,  no individual  employee  may  have  a
sufficient  incentive to decrease his  demand for  wages and  other bene-
fits  to obtain  increased  safety.  Because  the  benefits  of the  new  sub-
stance  are provided  to  everyone,  no individual  employee  will  "pay"
enough  to obtain them,  preferring instead  to take a  free  ride on oth-
ers.  The result will be too little safety on conventional economic  crite-
ria. Here a regulatory response is appropriate.
49.  See Richard Craswell,  Interpreting  Deceptive Advertising, 65  B.U.  L. REv.  657,  710-11
(1985).
50.  See Schucker et al.,  supra note 33,  at 55.
51.  See Rose-Ackerman,  supra  note 4,  at 356.  For its plausibility,  this argument  depends on
transactions cost barriers to free mobility  of labor. If labor were completely mobile, the problem
should disappear.
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C.  Externalities
I  can be brief on this point.  Sometimes risks are regulated  because,
when they come to fruition, many people are  harmed. When there are
adverse  "external"  effects  from risk-generating  activity,  the solution
is  not  merely  the  provision  of information.  If  people  are  told  that
companies  are  producing  pollution,  that is  all  to the  good.  But  it  is
often  not enough.  Regulation  should  require  the company  to  reduce
pollution  levels  to reduce  external  harms,  either  by taking  additional
care  or by reducing the level of polluting activity.
When the risk-generating  activity creates  harms to people not likely
to be in a contractual  relation with those who  engage in that activity,
it  is desirable  to supplement  information  strategies  with  economic  in-
centives  designed to produce  the optimal  activity  level.  If a company
is  emitting  carbon  dioxide  into  the atmosphere,  it  is not  enough  for
everyone  to  know about this fact.  Instead  the government  should  im-
pose  a tax or emissions fee designed to require the company to "inter-
nalize"  the cost of its activity.  Economic  incentives are in this sense a
necessary supplement to informational  strategies. 2
D.  Responding to Limitations
All  this  suggests  that  there  are  real  limitations  to  informational
strategies.  The limitations  should,  however,  be taken merely as quali-
fications  of  the broader  point,  or  as  providing  helpful  guidance  to
those  seeking  to  design  effective  information  requirements.  They do
not  argue  fundamentally  against reform  efforts.  While informational
strategies  are no panacea,  they  would  accomplish  considerable  good,
at least if the possible obstacles are kept firmly in mind.
The first and most important point is that some of these very limita-
tions  can  be  overcome  through  more  and  better  information.  An
awareness  of the distorting effects of current heuristics can  help over-
come  those effects.  General  publicity about  those effects might there-
fore  supply  a  corrective.  The  "availability"  heuristic  in  particular
would  be overcome  through making public and private sector  changes
in what risks come readily to mind.
Existing  studies  also  suggest  that  some  disclosure  remedies  will
work  better than  others.  Well-tailored  programs  would  minimize  the
relevant  risks  by putting  the information  in  its  most  understandable
form. Instead of labeling a substance a  "carcinogen,"  a uniform sys-
tem  of risk regulation  could give better awareness  of risk levels. 3  Ex-
52.  See Sunstein, supra note  *.
53.  See Viscusi  et al., supra note 21,  at 365.INFORMING AMERICA
cessive  detail  should  be  avoided;  the  relevant  information  should  be
crisp  and  simple.  Any disclosure  requirements  should  attend  to diffi-
culties in processing information.
In this light,  the current initiatives are simply a beginning.  Broader
and  more  ambitious  programs,  coordinating  the general  communica-
tion of social risks,  are very much in order.  It has been suggested that
government  might  eventually  develop  a  "national  warnings  system"
containing  a  systematized  terminology  for  warnings.14 Such  a  system
could apply to all contexts  and risks  and give  a uniform sense of risk
levels.  The existence of a uniform language would make it possible to
assess risks  across  a wide range  of social  spheres.  This step would in-
troduce  a healthy degree  of coordination  and  priority-setting in  regu-
lation.
Most important of all,  such  a system would perform  a vital educa-
tive function,  one that could complement  the functioning  of markets
and  provide  a  necessary  precondition  for  democratic  choice.  We
should ultimately  aspire to go far beyond  risk regulation,  to introduce
information  bearing  on  democratic  affairs  in  general.  The  First
Amendment  is a good place to start.
IV.  RECONCEIVING  THE  FIRST AMENDMENT:  A NOTE
We  have become accustomed  to the view that the First Amendment
is  a  barrier  against  content-based  restrictions  on  the  autonomy  of
speakers.  Our core  conception  of a  free  speech  violation  is  a  case  in
which the government silences a  speaker because it objects to what the
speaker is  saying.  This conception  has accomplished  enormous  good;
it has  served as the basic  model for a  series  of dramatic  victories  for
free expression.
Under current  conditions,  however,  this conception may well be in-
adequate."  A system of free expression will be in great jeopardy when
there  is  insufficient  information  about  public  affairs.  An  absence  of
information  may be a product not of direct government  controls,  but
54.  See Viscusi & MAGAT,  supra note 21,  at 155,  for an illustration of systemized warnings;
see also Viscusi, supra note  14, at  149-51.
55.  See J.M.  Balkin,  Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment,  1990 DUKE L.J.  375; Owen M.  Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71  IOWA L.
REV.  1405 (1986);  Onora O'Neill, Practices of Toleration, in DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  MASS  MEDIA:
A COLLECTION  OF  EssAYs  155  (Judith Lichtenberg  ed.,  1990);  T.M.  Scanlon,  Jr., Content Regu-
lation Reconsidered,  in DEMOCRACY  AND  TH  MASS  MEDIA:  A COLLECTrON  OF ESSAYS,  supra, at
331.  See generally Cass R.  Sunstein,  Free  Speech Now, 59 U. Cm.  L. Rav. 255  (1992),  on which
I draw  here.  The argument  of that  essay  will appear  in  much  more elaborate  form  in a  book,
FRE  SPEECH Now (forthcoming  1993).
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of  free  markets56  in  information.  If  so,  the  purposes  of  the  First
Amendment  might  be  promoted,  not  undermined,  by  content-based
regulatory initiatives.
Let me  be more  concrete.  Imagine that the consequence  of the cur-
rent system of free speech is a regime  in which most Americans do not
read  or see much  in the way of substantive  argument about what gov-
ernment  is  doing or ought to be doing.  Imagine too that there is  little
diversity  of view.  In  such  a  system,  the  system  of  free  expression
might  be  dominated  by  situation  comedies,  or  sensationalistic  stories
about  celebrities,  or  material  that  combines  sex with  violence.  Even
news  programming  might  feature  misleading  anecdotes  or  "horse
race"  stories rather than substance.  Imagine too that access  to the me-
dia is largely a product of how much other people are willing to pay to
hear the  relevant  voice-and  that this  system  is  importantly  affected
by the desires of advertisers  who indirectly,  sometimes  directly,  exer-
cise some control over programming content.
Is it so clear that the First Amendment would be violated by regula-
tory initiatives designed  to  increase attention to  public affairs  and di-
versity of view?  If  the  arguments  set  out  thus  far  are  persuasive,  a
democratic  correction may well be desirable.  If we understood  the sys-
tem  of free  expression  to be concerned  with  the dissemination  of in-
formation,  especially  about public affairs,  then such  a corrective  may
well  be compatible with,  even required by, our First Amendment  prin-
ciples.
At this point it might be suggested that in an era of cable television,
the relevant  problems  disappear.  People  can always  change  the chan-
nel.  Some  stations  even  provide  public  affairs  broadcasting  around
the clock.  Both quality and diversity can be found in light of the daz-
zling array of options  made available  by modern technology.  Viewers
can now choose  from a wide range of options.  In  this light, a concern
about the market status quo might seem to amount to a puzzling,  even
bizarre rejection  of freedom of choice.  Ought not a foreclosure  of ex-
pressive options be thought to infringe on freedom of speech?
There  are  several  answers.  The  first  point  would  reemphasize  my
earlier  suggestion  that information  has many characteristics  of a pub-
lic good,  like national  defense  or  clean  air."  It  is  well-known  that  if
56.  The  term  "free  markets"  may be  misleading  if it diverts  attention  from the  fact  that
markets  are created  by law and impose legal  constraints on  who may do  what.  In the context at
hand,  for example, people are deprived of access to the media,  not by voluntary  private acts, but
by  the civil and criminal law,  which prohibit  one person  from  (for example) getting on CBS  or
ABC to state a particular view.
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we rely entirely  on markets,  we will have insufficient national defense
and excessively  dirty  air. The reason is that both defense and clean air
cannot be feasibly provided to one person without simultaneously be-
ing provided to many  or all.  In these  circumstances,  each  person has
inadequate incentives to seek,  or to pay for, the right  level of national
defense or clean air. Acting individually,  each person will  "free  ride"
on the efforts of others. No producer  will have the appropriate incen-
tive  for production.  The result  will be  unacceptably  low  levels  of the
relevant goods.
Much  the same  is  true  of information,  especially  with  respect  to
public  affairs.  The benefits  of a  broad  public  debate,  yielding  large
quantities of information-through  coverage  of public  issues,  disclo-
sure of new  facts  and  perspectives,  and  diversity  of view-accrue  si-
multaneously  to many  or all people.  Once  information is  provided to
one  person,  or to  some  of them,  it  is  also  provided  to many  others
too,  or it  can be provided at  minimal cost.  The production  of infor-
mation for one  or some  person  thus yields large  external  benefits  for
other people as  well. But-and this is the  key point-the market  pro-
vides  no mechanism  to  ensure that these  benefits  will be  adequately
taken  into account  by those who produce the information, in this case
the newspaper and broadcasting  industries.
At  the  same  time,  the benefits  of  informing  one  person-making
him  or  her  an  effective  citizen-are  likely  to  accrue  to  many  other
people  as well  through that person's  contribution  to multiple conver-
sations and to political  processes  in general.  But the external  benefits
for each  person will not be taken into account  in individual  consump-
tion choices.5"
Because  of the  "public  good"  features  of  information,  no  single
person  has  sufficient  incentive  to  "pay"  for the benefits  he receives.
The result  will be that the market  will produce too little  information.
Reliance on media markets will therefore have some of the same diffi-
culties  as  reliance  on  markets  for  national  defense  or environmental
protection.  For this  reason,  a  regulatory solution,  solving  the collec-
tive action problem,  is justified. 9
Amendment,  105  HiAsv.  L. REv.  554  (1991).  Information  is not a pure public good because it is
often  feasible  to  provide  it to  those  who  pay  for  it.  Copyright  and patent  laws  can guarantee
appropriate  incentives for its production.  But information does have much in common with  pure
public  goods.
58.  Compare the discussion of participatory  goods in Denise Reaume,  Individuals, Groups,
and Rights to Public Goods,  38 U. TORONTo  L.J.  1 (1988).
59.  It might be  thought that the distinctive characteristics  of the broadcasting market  pro-
vide at least  a partial solution.  Because advertisers attempt  to ensure  large audiences,  viewers are
commodities as  well as or instead of consumers.  In these circumstances,  it is not as if individuals
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So  much  for the  public  good  issue.  The  second  point  is  that  the
absence  of scarcity  of outlets does not explain  why there  is a constitu-
tional  objection to democratic  efforts to increase  quality and diversity
by  ensuring better  programming  on  individual  stations.  Even with  a
large  number  of stations,  there  is  far  less  quality  and  diversity  than
there  might be.  Perhaps people can generate at least a partial solution
by  changing the channel.  But  why should the Constitution  be thought
to  foreclose  a collective  decision to experiment  with  new  methods  for
achieving the goals of a system of free expression?
Third,  it  is  important to  be  extremely  cautious  about  the  use,  for
constitutional and  political purposes, of the notion of "consumer  sov-
ereignty."  Consumer  sovereignty  is  the conventional  economic  term
for the  virtues  of a  free market,  in  which  commodities  are allocated
through consumer  choices and valued through the criterion  of private
willingness to pay. Those who invoke the notion of free choice in mar-
kets  are  really  insisting  on  consumer  sovereignty.  But the  constitu-
tional  conception  of "sovereignty"-rooted  in the  writings  of James
Madison-is the relevant one. 6  That conception  has an altogether dif-
ferent character.
On the Madisonian  view,  sovereignty  entails  respect not for  private
consumption  choices  but  for  the  considered  judgments  of  a  demo-
cratic polity.  In a democracy,  laws frequently  reflect those judgments
or  what  might  be  described  as  the  aspirations  of  the  public  as  a
whole.61 Those  aspirations  can  and  often  do  call  for  markets them-
selves.  But  they might  also diverge  from consumption  choices-a  fa-
miliar phenomenon  in such  areas as environmental  law,  protection  of
endangered  species,  social  security,  and  antidiscrimination  law.  For
present purposes, the most notable point is that information is crucial
for the  development  and expression of democratic  aspirations.  These
are purchasing individual pieces  of information.  Instead,  advertisers  are  aggregating  individual
preferences in seeking popular  programming  and,  in that sense,  helping to overcome the collec-
tive action problem.
The  problem  with  this  response is that the advertisers'  desire to attract large  audiences  does
not  adequately  serve the goal  of overcoming the  public good problem with  respect  to informa-
tion about  public affairs. A program  with a large audience may not be providing information  at
all; consider  most of network  television.  Advertisers  may even  be hostile to the provision  of the
relevant information.  Their economic interests  often argue against  sponsorship of public service
or controversial  programming,  especially if  the audience  is relatively  small,  but sometimes  even
if  it  is  large.  The  external  benefits  of  widely-diffused  information  about  politics  are  thus not
captured in a broadcasting market.  The peculiarities  of the broadcasting market overcome  a kind
of collective action  problem by  providing  a system  for  aggregating preferences,  but  they do not
overcome  the crucial  problem.
60.  See Sunstein, supra note 55.
61.  See JoN EISTER,  ULYSSES  AND  THE SIENS:  STUDIES  IN  RATiONALtY  AND  IRRATIONALITY
(1979);  HowARsD  MARGOLIS,  SELnsmNESS,  ALTRUiSm,  AND  RATIONALITY  (1982).INFORMING AMERICA
aspirations ought not to be disparaged.  Democratic  liberty should  not
be  identified  with  "consumer  sovereignty."  And  in  the  context  at
hand,  the people,  acting through  their  elected  representatives,  might
well  decide that democratic  liberty,  producing  greater  information,  is
more valuable than consumer sovereignty.
Finally,  private broadcasting  selections  are a product  of preferences
that are a result of the broadcasting  status quo and are not independ-
ent of it. In a world that provides  the existing fare,  it would be unsur-
prising if people  generally preferred  to see  what they are  accustomed
to  seeing.  They  have  not  been  provided  with  the  opportunities  of a
better  system.  When  this  is  so,  the broadcasting  status  quo cannot,
without circularity,  be justified by reference  to the preferences.
6
1 Pre-
ferences  that have  adapted to  an objectionable  system  cannot justify
that system.  If better options  are put more regularly in view,  it  might
well  be  expected  that  at  least  some  people  would  be  educated  as  a
result  and  be  more  favorably  disposed  toward  programming  dealing
with public issues in a serious way.
It is tempting but inadequate to object that this is a form of "pater-
nalism"  unjustifiably overriding  private choice.  If private  choice  is  a
product  of  existing  options,  then  the  inclusion  of  better  options,
through new law,  does  not  displace a  freely produced  desire.  At least
this is so if the  new law has a democratic pedigree.  In such a case, the
people,  in their  capacity as citizens,  are attempting to implement  aspi-
rations that diverge from their consumption choices.
What strategies  might emerge  from considerations  of this sort?  Re-
call  that  the overriding  goal  is  to increase  public  information  about
public affairs-a goal that  calls for substantive attention to public  is-
sues and  an opportunity  to speak  for divergent  views.  There  is thus  a
strong case for public provision of high-quality programming  for chil-
dren  or for  obligations,  imposed  by  government  on  broadcasters,  to
provide such programming.  The provision of free media  time to can-
didates  would  be  especially  helpful.  Such  a  route  would  simultane-
ously  provide  attention  to  public  affairs  and  diversity  of  view  and
overcome  the  distorting  effects  of  "soundbites"  and  financial  pres-
sures.
More generally,  government might  award "points"  to license  appli-
cants  who  promise  to  deal with  serious  questions  or  provide  public
affairs broadcasting  even if unsupported  by market  demand.  Or gov-
ernment might require  purely commercial  stations to provide  financial
subsidies to  public  television  or  to commercial  stations that  agree  to
62.  See  JON  ELSTER,  SOUR  GRAPES:  STUDIES  IN TiE  SUBVERSION  OF  RATIONALITY  (ed.  rev.
1984).
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provide  less  profitable but higher  quality programming.  Government
itself  should surely  subsidize  such  programming  or  use  its ownership
rights  (over,  for example,  airports  and  subways)  so  as  to  encourage
attention  to public  issues.  It  is  worthwhile  to consider  more dramatic
approaches  as  well-such  as  reductions  in  advertising  on  children's
television, content  review of such television by nonpartisan experts,  or
guidelines  to  encourage  attention  to  public  issues  and  diversity  of
view.
Views  of this sort would  reconceive  the responsibilities  of the mass
media.  They would  call  for both  public  and  private  action,  and  pre-
cisely in  the name of the First Amendment.  Under this approach,  the
free  speech  principle  would  bear  on  much  more  than  governmental
interferences  with  the autonomy  of speakers  with  current  ownership
rights.  It would  also make it necessary  for us to assess the connection
between the existing free  speech "market"  and the informational and
citizenship  goals of a  system of free expression.  It would draw on ex-
isting knowledge  of the limits of current "markets"  in information to
support  new free speech initiatives.  Above all,  it would refuse to iden-
tity laissez-faire in speech  with the dictates of the First Amendment.
V.  CONCLUSION
Our  current  regulatory  system  is  too  rigid  and  too  centralized;  it
provides  too little  basis  for improving  either  private  decisions  in the
marketplace or public decisions  in the ballot box.  Instead of mandat-
ing  particular  solutions  or  leaving  people  to  the  vicissitudes  of  the
market,  government should,  as its first line of defense,  require disclo-
sure of information  or provide information  on its own. A step of this
sort  could  revolutionize  the  activities  of many  government  agencies,
including  the  EPA,  the  FDA,  the CPSC,  and  OSHA.  Eventually  it
could help produce  a "national  warnings system"  that provides  clear
and concise information about  the risks faced in day-to-day life.
I  have  spent most  of my  time on informational  strategies  with  re-
spect to social risks,  but the analysis may extend much further. It sug-
gests reasons to question some of the received  wisdom  with respect to
free speech.  The defects in information markets may well call for gov-
ernmental  improvements  designed  to promote  attention  to  public  is-
sues and to generate a diversity of views.
The  broader  point  is  that  the  movements  for  democratization
throughout  the  world-in  South  Africa  and  Russia,  Romania  and
China,  Israel and Kuwait,  Bulgaria and Ukraine-are  far from  irrele-
vant to current reform efforts in the United States.  The massive regu-
latory  state,  an outgrowth  of the twentieth century, has  accomplished
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commitment to democratic  self-governance.  There could  be no better
first step,  by way of reform,  than to embark  on the project of substi-
tuting, for our inflexible  and interest-prone  current  controls,  a system
designed  to ensure that  in their  capacity  as  consumers,  workers,  and
voters,  Americans are well-informed.